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Over 60 years of research has led to a law-like acceptance of the Easterbrook (1959) 
hypothesis.  Easterbrook (1959) famously reviewed the evidence on the arousal-
attention link and concluded that as arousal increases, the range of cues utilized 
decreases, and the focus of attention narrows.  However, the present set of eight 
studies suggests that the Easterbrook hypothesis needs to be seriously qualified.  
Recent developments in the understanding of the role of arousal in information 
processing suggests that rather than invariably leading to a focus of attention, arousal 
instead serves as information regarding the urgency and/or importance of active 
processing strategies (Storbeck & Clore, 2008).  Because some processing strategie  
lead to a broadening of attention, arousal should sometimes be negatively related to a 
focusing of attention.  A first set of four studies investigated the need for closure as it 
relates to the arousal-attention link.  The need for closure refers to the motivation to 
make quick, firm judgments, and has been shown to lead to the use of fewer available 
  
cues.  Because of this, it seems that the need for closure should lead to a tendency to 
focus one’s attention.  However, when need for closure is low, individuals tend to 
process more available cues, broadening attention in order to avoid reaching 
premature closure.  The results indicate that when individuals are high on the need for 
closure, arousal is positively related to focus of attention, whereas when individuals 
are low on the need for closure, arousal is negatively related to focus of attention.  A 
second set of four studies investigated the influence of the regulatory modes of 
locomotion and assessment on the arousal-attention link.  Because locomotion is 
oriented towards movement, it should lead to a focus of attention.  Because 
assessment is oriented towards making evaluations based on comparisons among 
alternatives, it should lead to a broadening of attention.  The results show that when a 
locomotion mode is active, arousal is positively related to focus of attention, whereas, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
More than 60 years of psychological research has led to the conclusion that 
heightened arousal leads to a focusing of attention.  The Easterbrook hypothesis 
(1959) famously reviewed the empirical support for the relation between arousal and 
attention and proposed that arousal is inversely related to the range of cues utilized by 
the perceiver.  That is, as arousal levels increase, attention is focused on a narrower 
range of available cues.  For example, witnesses to a robbery, who are presumably 
highly aroused, show a “weapon focus,” in which they remember the gun, but cannot 
remember the robber (Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Loftus, 1979).  
In addition to explaining the simple relation between arousal and focus of 
attention, the Easterbrook hypothesis has been used to explain the Yerkes-Dodson 
law.  The Yerkes-Dodson law maps the relation between arousal and performance as 
an inverse U-shaped curve.  This curvilinear relationship illustrates the performance 
gains at moderate levels of arousal, but performance losses at very low and very high 
levels of arousal.  The relationship makes sense when considered according to the 
Easterbrook hypothesis.  At low levels of arousal, attention is unfocused, which 
allows task-irrelevant cues to distract the perceiver, leading to impaired performance.  
At moderate levels of arousal, attention becomes focused such that task-irrelevant 
cues are not attended to, leading to improved performance.  However, at high levels 
of arousal, further focusing of attention eliminates some task-relevant cues from 
attention, again leading to impaired performance.   
Despite the wide acceptance of the Easterbrook (1959) hypothesis, there are 
reasons to believe that it needs to be seriously qualified.  According to Easterbrook, 
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arousal should invariably lead to a focusing of attention.  However, it is presently 
argued that under some conditions it actually leads to a broadening of attention.  
Recent theoretical and empirical advances in the understanding of the role of arousal 
suggest that it serves as information regarding the urgency or importance of active 
goals (Storbeck & Clore, 2008).  Departing from the notion that arousal has 
informative value indicating the magnitude, but not the content, of individuals' 
epistemic motivations, it is proposed that it should lead to the focusing of attention 
when the activated processing goal aims at focusing, and to the broadening of 
attention when the activated processing goal aims at broadening of attention.  Th s 
general proposition was examined in a series of eight studies investigating epistemic 
motivations known to influence information processing.  Four studies investigated the 
impact of need for closure and four studies investigated the impact of the regulatory 
modes of locomotion and assessment on the arousal-attention link.  
Empirical Support for the Easterbrook Hypothesis 
The Easterbrook (1959) paper seemed to be successful in integrating much 
prior research, and was followed by even more empirical investigation testing it  
claims.  One of the most impressive aspects of this research program is the number of 
ways in which arousal has been operationalized.  In humans, whether arousal is 
operationalized according to individual differences in arousal level (Matthews & 
Brunson, 1979), physiological measurement, psychopharmacological manipulation 
(Anderson & Revelle, 1994), psychological threat (Bacon, 1974; Wachtel, 1968), 
anxiety (Tyler & Tucker, 1982; Zaffy & Bruning, 1966), or positive approach affect 
(Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), the same effect is found.  That is, across specific 
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operations, arousal has been found to be positively related to a focusing of attention 
and negatively related to the range of cues utilized. 
The relation between arousal and a focusing of attention found in humans has 
also been found in animals.  As stated by Bunsey and colleagues (Bunsey, Kramer, 
Kesler, & Strupp, 1990, p. 277-278), manipulations “that increase an animal's level of 
arousal have been found to exert significant, and surprisingly uniform, effects on cue 
utilization. Specifically, the administration of CNS stimulants (e.g., Anderson & 
Hockey, 1977; Callaway, 1959; Callaway & Stone, 1960), exposure to environmental 
stressors, such as noise or heat (e.g., Broadbent, 1971; Bursill, 1958; Hockey, 1970), 
and the experimental induction of heightened emotional or motivational states (e.g., 
Bahrick, Fitts, & Rankin, 1952; Bruner, Matter, & Papaneck, 1955; Cohen, Stettner, 
& Michael, 1969; Telegdy & Cohen, 1971) have all been shown to narrow the range 
of cues used by the subject, which is interpreted as an increase in attentional 
selectivity.”  
Most procedures used to measure focus of attention in tests of the Easterbrook 
hypothesis have employed a dual-task paradigm in which participants are instructed 
to complete a focal task, while simultaneously reporting instances in which perp eral 
stimuli are presented.   For example, researchers have studied the attention allocated 
to secondary stimuli in dual-task paradigms using both visual (Bacon, 1974; 
Matthews & Brunson, 1979; Wachtel, 1968) and auditory (Bacon, 1974) cues.  A 
series of studies showed that while performing a pursuit-meter tracking task, 
participants in a high arousal condition performed less well on a secondary visual 
detection task (Bahrick, Fitts, & Rankin, 1952; Bursill, 1958; Wachtel, 1968).  Again, 
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the positive relation between arousal and focus of attention has been consistent, 
regardless of the specific instruments used to measure focus of attention.  
One limitation with the paradigm that is typically used is that the focal task is 
explicitly more important than the peripheral task.  Just as in the ‘weapon focus’ 
phenomenon where the gun is more important to the individual who could potentially 
be shot than the details of the robbers face, the focal task is more important than the 
peripheral stimuli.  This creates a situation in which the dominant response is to focus 
attention in order to perform better on the focal task.  In this case, the introduction of 
high arousal augments this general tendency to focus attention by leading to even
greater focusing of attention.    It may be the case that arousal is not necessarily 
leading to the focus of attention, but instead is magnifying the dominant processing 
strategy in the situation. 
Arousal as Information 
Although a great body of research has developed supporting the Easterbrook 
hypothesis, the reason for the arousal-attention link is not known.  Recent theorizing 
on the impact of arousal on cognition has suggested that arousal “provides 
information about urgency or importance” (Storbeck & Clore, 2008, p. 1824).  
Arousal has been defined as “nonspecific physiological activation” and 
“nondirectional alertness” (e.g. Anderson & Revelle, 1994, p. 334).  It reflects an 
abstraction of many lower order physiological mechanisms.  Arousal is associated 
with activation of the sympathetic nervous system, the autonomic nervous system, or 
the endocrine system (Russell & Barrett, 1999).  According to arousal-as-informati n 
theory, any of these sources of arousal can serve as a signal regarding urgency and/or 
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importance (Storbeck & Clore, 2008).  Specifically, arousal should suggest how 
strongly an actor feels about something, and “feeling strongly about something should
intensify whatever value is signaled” (Storbeck & Clore, 2008, p. 1827).  In 
summary, arousal-as-information theory argues that “high arousal may intensify 
reliance on one’s currently active processing strategies” (Storbeck & Clore, 2008, p. 
1831).    
In support of arousal-as-information theory, research has shown that 
manipulations of arousal are misattributed to the targets of perception (to which the 
strength of the attitude is augmented).  Dutton and Aron (1974) manipulated arousal 
by having participants either cross a high suspension bridge or a low bridge.  After 
this manipulation, the male participants were greeted by an attractive female 
researcher who, as part of the debriefing, gave the participants her phone number.  
Participants in the high arousal condition were more likely to call the research 
assistant than participants in the low arousal condition, presumably because they 
misattributed the arousal they experienced while crossing the bridge with the strength 
of their attitudes toward the attractive woman.  Similarly, individuals aroused by 
physical exercise have subsequently rated cartoons as funnier (Martin, Hlow, & 
Strack, 1992) and erotic films as more sexually arousing and enjoyable (Cantor, 
Zillman, & Bryant, 1975).  
Some research has begun to investigate the role of arousal in the adoption and 
use of processing strategies.  However, this research has been limited to the study of
processing strategies derived from positive or negative emotional states (e.g., Bl ss, 
Clore, Golisano, Rabel, & Schwarz, 1996; Corson & Verrier, 2007; Hamm, Schupp, 
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& Weike, 2003; Gomez, Stahel, & Danuser, 2004; Storneck & Clore, 2005).  For 
example, happy individuals tend to use a relational processing strategy (i.e., find 
interrelations among objects), and this effect has been shown to be augmented by 
inducing a highly (vs. low) arousing happy mood (Corson & Verrier, 2007).   
The present research will build on these findings by investigating the role of 
processing strategies derived from epistemic motivations.  While the study of 
expected processing strategies derived from positive or negative mood states lends 
support for arousal-as-information theory, a more direct test would manipulate 
processing strategies explicitly.  Toward this aim, the need for cognitive closure and 
the regulatory modes of locomotion and assessment were manipulated.  This allows 
for a clear test of the hypothesis regarding arousal and processing strate ies.  One 
major implication of the arousal-as-information conceptualization is that the 
Easterbrook Hypothesis may need to be revised.  Rather than increasing levels of 
arousal leading to a focusing of attention, it may lead to a focusing or a broadening of 
attention, depending on the processing motivation that is active.   
The Need for Cognitive Closure 
In order to come to a conclusion while engaging in information processing, 
the knower must eventually terminate the search for information and render a 
decision or judgment.  The motivation to terminate the epistemic process has been 
termed the need for nonspecific cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 1989).  In other words, 
the need for closure reflects a desire for a firm answer to a question, any answer, as 
compared to confusion and ambiguity (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).  To attain this 
closure, the person is willing to accept any answer insofar as it affords a conclusi n 
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that is firm.  Once a plausible hypothesis has been generated and some evidence is 
gleaned in support of the hypothesis, the quest has been fulfilled.  This motive can 
stem from diverse origins.  For example, time pressure (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), 
mental fatigue (Webster, Richter and Kruglanski, 1995), environmental noise 
(Kruglanski, Webster and Klem, 1993), and alcohol ingestion (Webster, 1993) have 
all been shown to increase the need for closure.  Moreover, the need for closure can 
be the result of individual differences (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  Some 
individuals are simply less tolerant of the uncertainties of the unknown, whereas 
others may actually enjoy entertaining a great number of scenarios and possibilities 
before coming to closure (for possible developmental influences, see Mikulincer, 
1997).  The motivation to continue the epistemic process has been termed the need to 
avoid nonspecific closure.  In this case, non-commitment in the judgmental process is 
preferred.  This can occur when a person fears invalidity in hypothesis testing or 
when closure may lead to unwanted restrictions in the potential for judgment.  Thus, 
one may desire closure strongly, mildly or not at all, or even want to avoid it. 
Because individuals high on the need for closure desire a termination of the 
epistemic process, they should be motivated to focus their attention on few cues and 
base their judgment on that limited information.  The more information is processed, 
the longer the judgment task will take, and the greater the chance for inconsistent 
information to be detected.  In line with this assumption, individuals high (vs. low) on 
the need for closure have been shown to terminate information search more quickly 
(Dougherty & Harbison, 2007; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), to generate fewer 
hypotheses (Mayesless & Kruglanski, 1987), to base judgments on the most 
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accessible information (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995), to be more confident in their 
judgments (Mayesless & Kruglanski, 1987), and to experience less regret afte  
making poor decisions (Mannetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2007).  In contrast, 
individuals low on the need for closure (or high on the need to avoid closure) should 
be motivated to broaden their attention in order to glean as much available evidence 
as possible.  Based on arousal-as-information theory, these tendencies should be 
augmented under high arousal states.  Therefore, arousal should lead to a focusing of 
attention for individuals high on the need for closure, whereas arousal should lead to 
a broadening of attention for individuals low on the need for closure.   
Regulatory Modes 
According to regulatory mode theory, locomotion reflects the tendency for the 
individual to initiate and maintain consistent goal-directed progress without 
distractions or delays (Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000).  
In the locomotion mode, individuals emphasize movement rather than critical 
evaluation, preferring to stay in a state of perpetual motion.  Because of this, 
individuals high on the locomotion tendency tend to refrain from critical evaluation if 
stopping to reflect impedes continuous movement.  Indeed, research has demonstrated 
that individuals high on the regulatory mode of locomotion move faster through 
information processing tasks and consider fewer pieces of information (Kruglanski et 
al., 2000).  Because of this tendency to subordinate information processing to taking 
action, individuals high on the regulatory mode of locomotion would be motivated to 
focus their attention in order to direct their movement and to ignore potentially 
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distracting information.  Therefore, arousal should lead to a focusing of attention for 
individuals high on locomotion.   
According to regulatory mode theory, assessment reflects the tendency for an 
individual to evaluate and critically analyze information by comparing one thig o 
another (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000).  High levels of assessment 
result in greater effort invested in activities that afford comparisons, appraisals, and 
critical thinking.  Assessors prefer to engage in activities that allow them to evaluate, 
measure, or interpret information (Taylor & Higgins, 2002).  For example, 
individuals high (vs. low) on the assessment regulatory mode scrutinized a passage 
more carefully and found more errors in the passage during a proofreading task in 
which they were provided with a ‘master copy’ that was copy edited to be free of 
errors and a ‘sample copy’ that they were asked to correct to be consistent with the 
master copy (Kruglanski et al., 2000).  Because of this, individuals high on the 
regulatory mode of assessment should be motivated to broaden their attention, in 
order to process as many pieces of information as possible, affording many 
comparisons and evaluations.  Thus, arousal should lead to a broadening of attention 
for individuals high on assessment.   
Because the present research is testing for multiple moderators of the 
attention-arousal link, it is important to note that these moderators are conceptually 
and empirically distinct.  In contrast to previous theories, regulatory mode theory 
conceptualizes locomotion and assessment as distinct mode of self-regulation 
(Higgins et al., 2003).  A person’s chronic level of assessment is orthogonal to his or 
her chronic level of locomotion, and thus it is possible for individuals to be high on 
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both assessment and locomotion, low on both, or high on one and low on the other.  
Correlations between the scales are typically very low (r < .15).  In addition, 
situational manipulations of regulatory mode typically compare a condition in which 
locomotion is induced to a condition in which assessment is induced (Avnet & 
Higgins, 2003).  
Locomotion and assessment can also be distinguished from the need for 
closure.  Conceptually, the need for closure refers to the tendency to “seize” and 
“freeze” on the most accessible information.  That is, individuals high on the need for 
closure are motivated to make quick judgments that remain firm over time, allowing 
them to minimize times of uncertainty.  While individuals high on locomotion prefer 
to move quickly, they are not motivated to avoid uncertainty.  They are comfortable 
with uncertainty and strive for change.  Indeed, individuals high on locomotion thrive 
in situations where uncertainty is high and change is taking place (Kruglanski, Pierro, 
Higgins, & Capozza, 2007).  Rather than being concerned with the speed of closure, 
locomotors have been shown to prefer a decision-making style that allows them to 
experience progress throughout the course of information processing, focusing on a 
single attribute at a time (Avnet & Higgins, 2003).  When using a progressive 
elimination strategy, in which a single attribute is considered at a time, and options 
are eliminated one at a time based on their standing on each attribute.  It seems that 
this strategy would be too time consuming for an individual high on the need for 
closure to embrace, yet it is preferred by individuals high on locomotion.  Finally, the 
correlation between the need for closure scale and the locomotion scale is weak (r = 
.22, meaning that less than 5% of their variance is shared; Kruglanski et al., 2000).  
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Therefore, the need for closure construct can be distinguished from the locomotion 
construct on both conceptual and empirical grounds.   
Individuals high on the need to avoid closure prefer to avoid making a 
decision.  This is different from individuals high on assessment, who prefer to make 
many comparisons, but who are not motivated to avoid making a decision.  In fact, 
assessment leads to increased attention to the judgment process (Pierro, Orehek, & 
Kruglanski, in press).  Rather than avoiding making a decision, individuals high on 
assessment prefer specific decision-making strategies, namely those that allow for 
many comparisons among alternatives (Avnet & Higgins, 2003).  Finally, the 
correlation between need for closure and assessment is weak (r = .12, indicating less 
than 2% shared variance; Kruglanski et al., 2000).  Therefore, assessment can be 
conceptually and empirically distinguished from the need to for closure construct.  
Overview of Studies 
The present research investigates the potential moderation of the arousal-
attention link by processing strategies.  Specifically, it was expected that need for 
closure, locomotion, and assessment would interact with arousal to determine the 
focus/breadth of attention.  These studies employed two commonly-used measures of 
focus/breadth of attention.  Kimchi and Palmer (1982) developed a task in which 
participants are presented with an image of a larger shape (e.g., square) that is 
composed of smaller shapes (e.g., triangles).  Participants are then asked to det rmine 
which of two comparison images is most similar to the target.  One of the images is 
matched in terms of the global information (e.g. shaped as a square and composed of 
squares), while the other is matched in terms of the local information (shaped as a 
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triangle and composed of triangles).  Across trials, the more times a participant 
makes a similarity judgment based on the global composition of the shapes, the 
broader is the participant’s attention.  The number of times a participant makes a 
similarity judgment based on the global information indicates the breadth of his/her 
attention. 
Another commonly used procedure has been Navon’s (1977) letters task, in 
which a large letter is composed of smaller letters.  For example, a large T may be 
composed of smaller Ls.  Researchers have assumed that faster reactions to the local 
information (smaller Ls) represent a focusing of attention, whereas faster responses to 
the global information (larger T) reflect a broadening of attention (e.g., Tyler & 
Tucker, 1982).  The difference in the reaction times to the global as compared to the 
local trials reflects a single measure of focus/breadth of attention (Forster, Friedman, 
Ozelsel, & Denzler, 2005). 
A first set of four studies investigated need for closure, while a second set of 
four studies investigated locomotion and assessment.  Based on the analysis above, it 
was predicted that individuals high on the need for closure would exhibit a positive 
relationship between arousal and focus of attention, whereas participants low on need 
for closure would exhibit a negative relation between arousal and focus of attention.  
Also, individuals high on the regulatory mode of locomotion should exhibit a positive 
relation between arousal and focus of attention, whereas individuals high on the 
regulatory mode of assessment should exhibit a negative relation between arousal and 
focus of attention. 
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Because the Easterbrook hypothesis is firmly entrenched as a basic 
psychological principle, it is especially important to meticulously test the proposed 
alternative.  Toward this aim, each variable will be operationalized using multiple 
methods.  Each specific operation undoubtedly includes the measurement or 
manipulation of additional variables beyond the variable of interest.  By using 
multiple methods, we can be more confident that the variables of interest are driving
the effect.  One particularly important consideration in the present set of studies has 
to do with the valance of the arousal manipulations.  Past research has found support 
for the Easterbrook hypothesis for both positively-valenced and negatively-valenced 
arousal.  Across studies, arousal will be manipulated in each way, underscoring the 
generality of the findings.  This detail is also important because one possible 
alternative explanation would suggest that the valence of the stimuli is driving the 
effects rather than simply arousal.  If the effect is found for both positively and 
negatively-valanced arousal, then an explanation based on the valance of the arousal 
would be ruled out. 
Another feature of the current studies is that they use both correlational and 
experimental methods.  The correlational studies rely on well-established scal s 
developed to assess the need for closure, regulatory mode, arousal, and focus of 
attention variables.  The disadvantage of these studies is that they do not allow causal 
inferences to be made about the relations among the variables.  The experimental 
designs build on these studies by allowing for such conclusions to be reached.  
Studies 1-4 tested the potential moderating of the arousal-attention link by need for 
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closure.  Studies 5-8 investigated regulatory mode as a potential moderator of the link 
between arousal and attention. 
 To test the predictions regarding need for closure, participants in a first study 
completed a dispositional need for closure scale, a state measure of their arousal, and 
Kimchi and Palmer’s (1982) measure of focus of attention.  In order to replicate the 
findings from this study using an experimental design, a second study manipulated 
need for closure and positively-valenced arousal, and measured focus of attention 
(again using the Kimchi and Palmer measure).  A third study attempted to extend 
these results when negatively-valenced arousal was induced.  A fourth study 
attempted to replicate the previous studies and extend their results to a different 
measure of focus of attention (Navon’s letters task).  
 To test the predictions regarding the regulatory modes of locomotion and 
assessment, participants in a fifth study completed dispositional measures of 
locomotion and assessment, a state measure of arousal, and Navon’s (1977) letters 
task as a measure of focus of attention.  A sixth study experimentally manipulated 
locomotion versus assessment and positively-valenced arousal, and measured focus of 
attention using Navon’s (1977) measure. A seventh study manipulated locomotion 
versus assessment, positively-valenced arousal, and measured focus of attenti n usi g 
Kimchi and Palmer’s (1982) measure.  An eighth study manipulated locomotion 
versus assessment, negatively-valenced arousal, and measured focus of attention
using Kimchi & Palmer’s (1982) measure. 
 These studies were designed to test the hypotheses using multiple research 
methodologies in such a way that need for closure, regulatory mode, and arousal are 
15 
each both measured and manipulated.   The arousal variable was operationalized 
using both positively-valenced and negatively-valenced stimuli.  In addition, arusal 
was measured and manipulated using both verbal stimuli (i.e., passages and Likert 
scales) and also nonverbal stimuli (i.e., pictures).  Across studies, the valence and the 
mode of presentation was crossed.  Finally, the focus of attention variable was 
measured using both a reaction time measure (Navon, 1977) and a similarity-based 
decision task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982).  The focus of attention tasks were crossed 
with the various other changes to ensure maximum generalizability. An overview of 
the research design is presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1.  Overview of Research Designs 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Study  Arousal Arousal Moderator Moderator  Focus of 
  Valence Stimuli   Operation Attention 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
   1  Measured   NFC  Measured K & P 
   2  Positive Passages NFC  Manipulated K & P 
   3  Negative Pictures NFC  Manipulated    K & P 
   4  Negative Pictures NFC  Manipulated Navon 
   5  Measured   Reg Mode Measured Navon 
   6  Positive Pictures Reg Mode Manipulated Navon 
   7  Positive Pictures Reg Mode Manipulated Navon 




 If the predicted pattern of results is found across the eight studies, then the 
Easterbrook hypothesis will need to be revised.  Rather than invariably leading to a 
focus of attention, the link between arousal and attention will depend on the active 
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processing strategy, with arousal leading to a focusing of attention under high need 
for closure and high locomotion and leading to a broadening of attention under low 
need for closure and high assessment.  In addition, the arousal-as-information theory 
(which is currently at odds with the widely accepted Easterbrook hypothesis) will 
have been supported.  In addition, the results would have important implications for 
the impact of need for closure, locomotion, and assessment, while also suggesting 
similar implications for other processing strategies.  This would mark a significant 
change to a core aspect of psychological knowledge. 
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Chapter 2: The Present Research 
Study 1 
As an initial test of the hypotheses, participants completed measures of their 
dispositional need for cognitive closure and state arousal level.  In addition, 
participants completed a measure of focus/breadth of attention.  Based on the 
foregoing analysis, an interaction between arousal and need for closure was predicted, 
such that arousal would be positively related to a focus of attention for those high on 
the need for cognitive closure, but would be negatively related to focus of attention 
for those low on the need for closure.   
Method 
Participants 
 Fifty-three undergraduates (39 female, 14 male) at the University of Maryland 
enrolled in psychology courses participated in exchange for course credit.  The age of 
participants ranged from 18 to 28 years, with a mean age of 21.1 years.  
Procedure 
 Participants first completed the need for closure scale, followed by the 
perceived arousal scale.  Participants then completed a measure of focus of attention.  
The arousal scale was measured second because arousal is conceptualized as sensitive 
to momentary internal and environmental changes.  As such, the greater the proximity 
to the attention task, the more valid should be its measurement.  In contrast, the need 
for closure scale is conceptualized as a relatively stable trait in which a slight (i.e., a 
few minutes) difference in the time of administration should not alter scores on the
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scale.  All measures were completed on a computer in a private room in a psychology 
laboratory. 
 Need for Cognitive Closure.  Participants completed the need for closure scale 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), as revised by Roets and Van Hiel (2007).  The revised 
scale substitutes six new items on the decisiveness subscale for eight previously used 
items.   The revised scale contains 41 items to which participants respond on a Likert
scale, with response options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  
Sample items include, “Any solution to a problem is better than remaining in a state 
of uncertainty” and “I prefer to be with people who have the same ideas and tastes as 
myself.”  After reverse scoring appropriate items, the mean of the 41 itms serves as a 
composite score, with higher scores indicating greater need for closure.  The revised 
scale has been shown to load on a single factor, and to be reliable (Roets & Van Hiel, 
2007). In this sample, Chronbach’s alpha was .85. 
 Perceived Arousal.  Participants completed the 24-item perceived arousal 
scale (Anderson, Anderson, & Deuser, 1996; Anderson, Deuser, & DeNeve, 1995).  
This scale measures state arousal, using a self-report Likert scale, anchored at the 
ends with 1 (very slightly or not at all) and 5 (extremely).  Sample items include 
“drowsy,” “exhausted,” “alert,” and “excited.”  After reverse scoring appropriate 
items, a composite score is computed by averaging across items.  Chronbach’s alpha 
for this scale was .90. 
Focus of Attention.  Participants completed Kimchi and Palmer’s (1982) local-
global processing task.  In this task, participants are presented with an image in which 
a larger shape (e.g. square) is composed of smaller shapes (e.g. triangles).  
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Participants are then asked to determine which of two comparison images is most 
similar.  One of the images is matched in terms of the global information (shaped as a 
square, but composed of squares), while the other is matched in terms of the local 
information (composed of triangles, but shaped as a triangle).  Participants completed 
16 items, depicted on page 526 of Kimchi and Palmer (1982).  The number of items 
in which a global response was given was used as an indication of the breadth of the 
perceiver’s attention (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). 
Results 
A regression analysis was performed to test the predicted interaction between 
need for closure and arousal, with both measures entered as continuous variables.  
Following the recommendation of Aiken and West (1991), the variables were 
centered, and the interaction terms were based on these centered scores.  As shown in
Table 2, the analysis revealed a significant interaction between need for closure and 
arousal (β = - .421, t = 3.29, p = .002).  To decompose this interaction, Aiken and 
West’s (1991) procedure for plotting the lines one standard deviation above and 
below the mean of the moderator (need for closure) was followed, as shown in Figure 
1.  To further probe the nature of the interaction effects, between arousal and need for 
closure, a simple slopes analysis was performed in accordance with Aiken and West’s 
(1991) recommendation.  This analysis revealed that the relationship between arousal 
and breadth of attention was significantly positive for individuals low on need for 
closure (β = .33, t = 2.0, p = .05), whereas the relationship between arousal and 
breadth of attention was significantly negative for individuals high on the need for 
closure (β = -.41, t = -2.33, p = .024).   
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Table 2. Summary of Regression Analysis (Study 1) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable   B SE(B)       β       t         p 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Need for Closure           -.89 .86   -.13    -1.04        .31 
Arousal            -.22 .68   -.04    -.32        .75 
NFC X Arousal         -4.02 1.22   -.42    -3.29        .002 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
R2 = .21 
 
 






















Low Need for Closure
High Need for Closure
 
Discussion 
The results from Study 1 are consistent with the hypotheses.  Individuals 
dispositionally high on the need for closure exhibited a positive relationship between 
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arousal and focus of attention, whereas individuals low on the need for closure 
exhibited a negative relation between arousal and focus of attention.   These result 
provide initial support for the prediction that processing strategy would interact with 
the level of arousal to determine focus/breadth of attention.   Based on the results of 
this study, it seems that in contrast to the Easterbrook hypothesis, arousal is 
associated with a broadening of attention for individuals low on the need for closure. 
Although the results from the first study are consistent with the predictions, 
both the arousal and need for closure variables were measured rather than 
manipulated.  The present conceptual framework argues that the need for closure and 
arousal variables cause the level of focus/breadth of attention.  However, Study 1 
does not allow us to test such a claim due to the correlational method.  Therefore, a 
second study was designed in order to address this issue.  In Study 2, both the need 
for closure and the arousal variables were experimentally manipulated.  
Study 2 
The aim of Study 2 is to conceptually replicate the findings from Study 1 
using an experimental design.  Specifically, need for closure was manipulated by 
having participants recall times in which they sought closure or times in which they 
avoided closure.  Arousal was manipulated by having participants read arousing 
passages or neutral passages.  Focus/breadth of attention was measured using the




Seventy-five University of Maryland undergraduates enrolled in psychology 
courses (50 women, 25 men) participated in exchange for credit in their psychology 
course.  Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 24, with a mean age of 20.1.   
Procedure 
Need for Cognitive Closure.  To manipulate need for closure, a modified 
version of the behavior recall paradigm used by Avnet and Higgins (2003) was used.  
Avnet and Higgins (2003) manipulated regulatory mode by having participants recall 
times win which they behaved as assessors or as locomotors (the two possible 
regulatory modes).  To do this, participants were asked to “think back to times in 
which they …” followed by an item from the regulatory mode scale.  In each 
condition, three items consistent with the induced regulatory mode were used.  In the 
present study, six items from the need for closure scale were used.  In the high n ed 
for closure condition, participants recalled times in which they “believed that 
orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics of a good 
student,” “quickly became impatient and irritated when I did not find a solution to a 
problem immediately,” and “felt irritated when one person disagreed with what 
everyone else in a group believed.”  In the high need to avoid closure condition, 
participants recalled times in which “Even after you made up your mind about 
something, you were eager to consider a different opinion,” “When thinking about a 
problem, you considered as many different options on the issue as possible,” and 
“Disliked the routine aspects of your work or studies.” 
Arousal.  To manipulate arousal, participants read passages derived from the 
Affective Norms for English Text (ANET; Bradley & Lang, 2007) database of 
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passages pre-tested with respect to level of arousal.  Participants in all co ditions 
were told that the passages are being pre-tested for a future experiment, and that we 
would like them to rate how arousing and positive each picture is using the self 
assessment manikin (SAM; Lang, 1980). Participants in the high arousal condition 
were presented with sentences pre-tested to be arousing.  Participants in the low 
arousal condition were presented with sentences low on arousal.  In this study, we 
used pictures pre-tested to be arousing and positively-valenced in the high arousal 
condition.  Pictures in the low arousal condition were neutral in valence.   
Manipulation Check. The rating of their arousal level on the SAM while 
reading the passages serves as a manipulation check on the efficacy of the arusal 
manipulation.  This measure asks participants to rate on a 9-point scale the extent to 
which they are feeling aroused.  The points are associated with a cartoon image 
expressing low to high states of arousal and valence.   
Breadth of Attention.  Participants completed the same local-global processing 
task as in Study 1 (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982).   
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 To check the efficacy of the arousal manipulation, the responses to the SAM 
arousal scale were analyzed using a 2 (Need for Closure: Low versus High) x 2 
(Arousal: Low versus High) between-subjects ANOVA.  This analysis reveal d a 
significant main effect for arousal condition, such that participants in the hig arousal 
condition reported significantly higher levels of arousal (M = 6.55, SE = .25) than did 
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participants in the low arousal condition (M = 3.19, SE = .27), F(1, 71) = 82.41, p < 
.001.  No other significant effects emerged, all Fs < 1. 
Breadth of Attention 
To investigate the influence of the experimental manipulations on breadth of 
attention, a 2 (Need for Closure: Low versus High) x 2 (Arousal: Low versus High)
between-subjects ANOVA was conducted.  As shown in Table 3, this analysis 
revealed a significant interaction between need for closure and arousal, F(1, 71) = 
8.71, p < .01.  Under high need for closure, participants in the high arousal condition 
(M = 12.16, SE = .77) exhibited lesser breadth of attention than participants in the low 
arousal condition (M = 14.47, SE = .81), F(1, 71) = 4.32, p < .05.  Under low need for 
closure, participants in the high arousal condition (M = 14.52, SE = .73) exhibited 
greater breadth of attention than participants in the low arousal condition (M = 12.28, 
SE = .79), F(1, 71) = 4.40, p < .05.  These means for each condition are depicted in 
Figure 2.  
 
Table 3. Summary of Analysis of Variance (Study 2) 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Source       SS       DF       MS           F 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Need for Closure    .14        1       .14          .91 
 
Arousal     .02        1       .002        .97 
 
NFC x Arousal  96.23        1       96.83      8.71* 
 
Error   789.61        71       11.12  
_______________________________________________ 
 































The data from Study 2 conceptually replicate the results from Study 1 when 
both the need for closure and the arousal variables were experimentally manipulated.  
Specifically, it was predicted and found that individuals high on the need for closure 
exhibited greater focusing of attention under high (vs. low) states of arousal, whereas 
individuals low on the need for closure exhibited greater broadening of attention 
under high (vs. low) states of arousal.  These results build on those of Study 1 by 
allowing for the conclusion that need for closure and arousal jointly cause a 
focusing/broadening of attention.  
However, because the arousal manipulation was also positively-valenced, it is 
possible that the moderation of the arousal-attention link by need for closure is 
limited to cases in which the arousal is positive.  It is possible that the presentation of 
positive stimuli after the need for closure variables served as an indication that the 
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need for closure was desirable (Clore et al., 2001).  This explanation would 
undermine the conclusion that need for closure moderates the arousal-attention link.  
An additional study inducing negatively-valenced arousal would address this isue.  
This alternative explanation would not apply to cases in which  need for closure 
moderates the link between negatively-valenced arousal and focus/breadth of 
attention.  Therefore, a third study was conducted in which the arousal inducing 
stimuli were negatively-valenced. 
Study 3 
Two changes were made in the experimental design in order to increase the 
confidence in the interpretation of the results thus far.  First, the arousal inductio  was 
negatively-valenced.  Second, the arousal induction utilized pictures rather than 
passages.  This study is therefore seeking to replicate the findings of the first two 
studies using a third operation of the arousal variable.  As in the previous study, need 
for closure was manipulated using the behavior recall paradigm and focus of attention 
was measured using Kimchi and Palmer’s (1982) task.   
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty undergraduate psychology students participated in exchange for course 
credit.  Thirty eight participants were women, and twenty-two participants were men, 
with participant age ranging from 18 to 29 (M = 21.2). 
Procedure 
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Need for Cognitive Closure.  Need for closure was manipulated using the 
same procedure as in Study 2. 
Arousal.  To manipulate participants’ arousal, participants were presented 
with pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley 
& Cuthbert, 2005).  Participants in all conditions were told that the pictures were 
being used to clear their mind before performing another cognitive task.  Then seven 
pictures will be presented for 12 seconds each (Orehek, Bessarabova, Chen, & 
Kruglanski, 2009).  Participants in the igh arousal condition were presented with 
pictures pre-tested to be arousing.  Participants in the low arousal condition will be 
presented with pictures pre-tested to be non-arousing.  In this study, the arousing 
pictures were rated as negatively-valenced in pre-testing. 
Breadth of Attention.  Participants completed the same local-global processing 
task as in Studies 1 and 2 (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982).   
Results 
To test the hypotheses regarding breadth of attention, a 2 (Need for Closure: 
High vs. Low) x 2 (Arousal: High vs. Low) between-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted.  As shown in Table 4, this analysis revealed a significant two-way 
interaction, F(1, 56) = 10.92, p < .01.  The cell means are displayed in Figure 3.  In 
the high need for closure condition, participants’ attention was broader under low 
arousal (M = 14.69, SE = .56) than under high arousal (M = 12.92, SE = .62), F(1, 56) 
= 4.41, p < .05.  In the low need for closure condition, participants’ attention was 
broader under high arousal (M = 14.63, SE = .56) than under low arousal (M = 12.53, 
SE = .58), F(1, 56) = 6.68, p < .05.   
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Table 4. Summary of Analysis of Variance (Study 3) 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Source       SS       DF       MS           F 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Need for Closure    .76        1       .76          .15 
 
Arousal     .40        1       .40          .08 
 
NFC x Arousal  55.36        1       55.36      10.92** 
 
Error   283.84        56       5.07  
_______________________________________________ 
 
** p < .01 
 



























The results from Study 3 conceptually replicate the findings from Studies 1 
and 2.  Whereas Study 2 induced positively-valenced arousal, Study 3 induced 
negatively-valanced arousal.  Consistent with prior research (Bacon, 1974; Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2008; Tyler & Tucker, 1982; Wachtel, 1968; Zaffy & Bruning, 1966), 
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it seems that both positively-valanced and negatively-valanced arousal have the same 
effect on focus/breadth of attention.  Therefore, it seems that arousal is causing the 
level of focus/breadth of attention rather than the valance of the stimuli, as would be 
expected based on previous research.  Across the three studies, three operations of the 
arousal variable and two operations of the need for closure variable have produced 
the same pattern of findings.  Taken together, the first three studies provide strong 
support for the notion that arousal and need for closure interact to determine 
focus/breadth of attention.    
Yet, each of the first three studies measured focus/breadth of attention with 
the Kimchi and Palmer (1982) measure.  Therefore, it is important to show that this 
effect can be generalized to another commonly-used measure of focus/breadth of 
attention.  Study 4 was designed to test this possibility.  Whereas the Kimchi and 
Palmer (1982) measure asks participants to make a similarity judgment, Navon’s 
(1977) letter’s task, used in Study 4, asks participants to respond as quickly and as 
accurately about the presence of a letter.  In this case, the time it takes participants to 
locate the stimuli is used to measure focus/breadth of attention.  On some trials, 
focused attention would lead to faster responses, while broadened attention would 
lead to faster responses on other trials.  This way, we can see whether the results 
extend beyond a judgment in which participants can take as long as they would like to 
respond. 
Study 4 
The experimental design used in the fourth study was identical to that of 
Study 3, except for the measure of focus/breadth of attention.  In this Study, the 
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Kimchi and Palmer (1982) measure was replaced by Navon’s (1977) letters task.  
Need for closure was once again manipulated by having participants recall times in 
which they sought closure or times in which they avoided closure and arousal was 
manipulated by having participants view negatively-valenced arousing pictures or 
neutral pictures.   
Method 
Participants 
Fifty University of Maryland undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses 
participated (31 women, 19 men).  The age of participants ranged from 18 to 28, with 
a mean age of 20.9.  They were compensated in the form of credit in their psychology 
course.   
Procedure 
Need for Cognitive Closure.  Need for closure was manipulated using the 
same procedure as in Studies 2 and 3. 
Arousal.  Arousal was manipulated in the same way as Study 3.  
Focus of Attention.  As a measure of focus of attention, participants completed 
Navon’s (1977) letters task.   As in prior research (e.g. Forster, et al., 2005; Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2008; Tyler & Tucker, 1982), participants were presented with large 
letters composed of smaller letters.   In this task, an orienting + appears on the screen 
for 500ms, followed by the letter image.   Participants are instructed to press one key 
(left shift) if the image contains a T, but another key (right shift) if the image contains 
an H.  On global trials, a large T or H is composed of smaller Ls or Fs.  On local 
trials, a large L or F is composed of smaller Ts or Hs.  As a measure of focus of 
31 
attention, the average response latency to global trials is subtracted from the average 
response latency to local trials, with higher scores representing greater global focus of 
attention (Forster et al., 2005).  Participants completed 48 global trials and 48 local 
trials.  Because responses to incorrect responses would be difficult to interpret, only 
correct responses were included in data analysis.  Following prior research ( .g. 
Forster, et al., 2005; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Tyler & Tucker, 1982), responses 
over three standard deviations from the mean were excluded from analysis in order to 
limit the influence of outliers.   
Results 
This study employed a 2 (Need for Closure: Low versus High) x 2 (Arousal: 
Low versus High) between-subjects factorial design.  As shown in Table 5, this 
analysis revealed a significant interaction between need for closure and arousal, F(1, 
46) = 8.77, p <. 01.  Under high need for closure, participants in the high arousal 
condition exhibited lesser breadth of attention (M = 1.28, SE = 21.59) than 
participants in the low arousal condition (M = 62.32, SE = 19.31), F(1, 46) = 4.44, p < 
.05.  Under low need for closure, participants in the high arousal condition exhibited 
greater breadth of attention (M = 66.39, SE = 22.55) than participants in the low 
arousal condition (M = 1.30, SE = 21.59), F(1, 46) = 4.35, p < .05.  The means for 










Table 5. Summary of Analysis of Variance (Study 4) 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Source       SS          DF    MS            F 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Need for Closure   51.54           1             51.54           .01 
 
Arousal    50.50           1  50.50          .01 
 
NFC x Arousal  49069.13      1  49069.13      8.77** 
 
Error   275375.28     46  5595.12  
_____________________________________________________ 
 
** p < .01 
 


























The results from Study 4 extend the findings from the first three studies to a 
reaction time based measure of focus/breadth of attention.  Taken together, the resul s 
from the need for closure studies consistently confirm the hypotheses.  The 
hypotheses, derived from arousal-as-information theory (Strorbeck & Clore, 2008) 
and lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1989), suggest an important revision to the 
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Easterbrook (1959) hypothesis.  Rather than a simple, direct link between heightened 
levels of arousal and a focusing of attention, this link depends on the epistemic 
motivation of the person.  When the processing motivation engenders a focusing of 
attention, as is the case with high need for closure, then arousal leads to a focusing f 
attention.  However, when the processing motivation engenders a broadening of 
attention, as is the case with low need for closure (or high need to avoid closure), 
arousal leads to a broadening of attention.  Yet this interaction can be understood 
according to a simple observation, namely, that arousal signals the urgency or 
important of a processing strategy (Storbeck & Clore, 2008).  The studies on need for 
closure are the first to search for such a processing strategy.  In all, this pa tern of 
results was found across four studies that employed two operations of the need for 
closure variable, three operations of the arousal variable, and two operations of the 
attention variable, utilizing both correlational and experimental designs.   
 Although such a moderation of the arousal-attention link by need for closure 
is interesting, the more general point to be made is that processing strategy should 
interact with arousal to determine whether attention is focused or broadened.  This 
point would be much stronger if the same effect was found for additional processing 
strategies beyond the need for closure.  The next four studies were designed to test 
such a possibility by investigating the interaction between the regulatory modes of 
locomotion and assessment and arousal on focus/breadth of attention.   
Study 5 
Study 5 was designed to investigate the possibility that the findings from the 
first four studies can be extended to other processing motivations relevant to the 
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breadth of attention; specifically, the regulatory modes of locomotion and assessment.  
As in Study 1, the motivational variables (locomotion and assessment) were assessed 
via an individual difference self-report scale designed to tap relatively stable 
dispositions.  Following this, participants completed the same measure of state 
arousal as in Study 1.  Finally, participants completed Navon’s (1977) letters task as  
measure of breadth of attention, as used in Study 4.   
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-two undergraduate students (47 female, 15 male) enrolled in a 
psychology course participated in exchange for course credit.  Participants’ age 
ranged from 18 to 30, with a mean age of 20.7.  
Procedure 
 Regulatory Mode.  The locomotion and assessment scales (Kruglanski et al., 
2000) constitute two separate 12-item self-report measures designed to tap individual 
differences in these orientations.  Specifically, respondents rated the extent to which 
they agree with self-descriptive statements reflecting locomotion (e.g., "By the time I 
accomplish a task, I already have the next one in mind") or assessment (e.g., I spend a 
great deal of time taking inventory of my positive and negative characteristi s").  
Ratings were made on a 6-point Likert scales with the response alternatives anchored 
at the ends with 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Two composite scores 
(one for Locomotion and one for Assessment) were computed by averaging across 
items after appropriate items were reverse scored.   Chronbach’s alpa for the 
locomotion scale was .81, and for the assessment scale was .78.   
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 Perceived Arousal.  Participants completed the same 24-item arousal scale 
used in Study 1 (Anderson et al., 1996; Anderson, et al., 1995).  In this sample, 
Chronbach’s alpha was .88. 
Focus of Attention.  Participants completed Navon’s (1977) letters task as in 
Study 4. Again, the average response latencies to global trials were subtracted f om 
the average response latencies to local trials, with higher scores representing greater 
global focus of attention (Forster et al., 2005).   
Results 
Two regression analyses were performed to test the predicted interaction 
between regulatory mode and arousal.  In the first regression analysis, locomoti n and 
arousal were both entered as continuous variables.  The variables were centered, and 
the interaction terms were based on these centered scores (Aiken & West, 1991).  The 
analysis revealed a significant interaction between locomotion and arousal (β = - .36, 
t = 2.89, p = .01), shown in Table 6.  To decompose this interaction, the lines were 
plotted one standard deviation above and below the mean of the moderator 
(locomotion).  This interaction is depicted in Figure 5.  To further probe the nature of 
the interaction effects between arousal and locomotion, a simple slopes analysis w s 
performed (Aiken & West, 1991).  This analysis revealed that the relationship 
between arousal and breadth of attention was significantly positive for individuals 
low on locomotion (β = .38, t = 2.11, p = .04), whereas the relationship between 
arousal and breadth of attention was negative for individuals high on locomotion (β = 
-.33, t = -1.93, p = .058).   
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Table 6. Summary of Regression Analysis for Locomotion (Study 5) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable   B SE(B)       β       t         p 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Locomotion                   -3.38 12.47   -.03    -.27        .79 
Arousal           2.30 14.44    .03      .21        .84 
Loc X Arousal                  -61.92 21.43   -.36    -2.89        .01 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
R2 = .13 
 


























In the second regression analysis, assessment and arousal were both entered as 
continuous variables.  Again, the variables were centered, and the interaction terms 
were based on these centered scores.  Table 7 shows that the analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between assessment and arousal (β = .36, t = 2.93, p = .01).  To 
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decompose this interaction, as shown in Figure 6, the lines were plotted one standard 
deviation above and below the mean of the moderator (assessment).  To further probe 
the nature of the interaction effects between arousal and assessment, simple slopes 
analyses were carried out (Aiken and West, 1991).  These analyses revealed that the 
relationship between arousal and breadth of attention was significantly negative for 
individuals low on assessment (β = -.35, t = -2.01, p = .049), whereas the relationship 
between arousal and breadth of attention was positive for individuals high on 
assessment (β = .32, t = 1.98, p = .053).   
 
Table 7. Summary of Regression Analysis for Assessment (Study 5) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable   B SE(B)       β       t         p 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Assessment                   6.11         14.48     .06     .48        .63 
Arousal         -1.67 14.48    -.01    -.12        .91 
Assess X Arousal        60.89 20.77     .36    2.93        .01 
__________________________________________________________ 
 




































The results from Study 5 confirm the predictions with respect to locomotion 
and assessment.  A positive relationship between arousal and focus of attention was 
found for individuals dispositionally high on the locomotion tendency and low on the 
assessment tendency.  A negative relationship between arousal and focus of attenti n 
was found for individuals dispositionally low on the locomotion tendency and high on 
the assessment tendency.  These results provide initial support for the prediction that 
the regulatory modes of locomotion and assessment would moderate the arousal-
attention link.  Importantly, they build on the findings from the need for closure 
studies by providing support for the more general point that processing strategies 
should interact with arousal to determine focus/breadth of attention.   
Although the results of this study provide support for the predictions, the 
correlational nature of the design prevents any conclusions regarding the causal roles 
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of regulatory mode and arousal in determining focus/breadth of attention.   Therefore, 
Study 6 was designed in order to test the predicted causal relationship by 
experimentally manipulating the regulatory mode and arousal variables.  
Study 6 
An experimental design was used in Study 6 in order to conceptually replicate 
the findings from Study 5.  Specifically, regulatory mode was manipulated using the 
behavior recall paradigm in which participants recall times when they successfully 
operated in a locomotion mode or successfully operated in an assessment mode.  
Arousal was manipulated by presenting participants with positively-valenced 
arousing pictures or neutral pictures.  Focus of attention was again measured u ing 
Navon’s (1977) letters task. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-nine University of Maryland undergraduates enrolled in psychology 
courses participated in exchange for course credit.  Thirty-nine participants were 
female, and twenty were male. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 28, with a 
mean age of 21.1. 
Procedure 
Regulatory Mode.  To manipulate regulatory mode, the behavior recall 
paradigm used by Avnet and Higgins (2003) will be used.  Avnet and Higgins (2003) 
manipulated regulatory mode by having participants recall times in which they 
behaved as assessors or as locomotors.  To do this, participants were asked to “think 
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back to times in which they …” followed by an item from the regulatory mode scale.  
In each condition 3 items consistent with the regulatory mode were used.  For the 
locomotion condition, participants recalled times in which they “acted like a ‘doer,'” 
“finished one project and did not wait long before you started a new one,” and 
“decided to do something and you could not wait to get started.”  In the assessment 
condition, participants recalled times in which they “compared yourself with other
people,” “thought about your positive and negative characteristics,” and “critiqued 
work done by others or yourself.” 
Arousal.  Arousal was manipulated using the same general procedures as 
Studies 3 and 4 by presenting participants with seven pictures from the IAPS for 12 
seconds each (Lang, et al., 2005).  In contrast to Studies 3 and 4, participants in the 
high arousal condition were presented with positively-valanced arousing pictures.  In 
the low arousal condition, participants were presented with neutral pictures.  
Breadth of Attention.  Participants completed the same letter’s task (Navon, 
1977) as in Studies 4 and 5.   
Manipulation Check.  To check the efficacy of the arousal manipulation, 
participants completed the 24-item perceived arousal scale used in Studies 1 and 5 
(Anderson et al., 1996; Anderson, et al., 1995).   
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 To check the efficacy of the arousal manipulation, a 2 (Regulatory Mode: 
Locomotion vs. Assessment) x 2 (Arousal: Low vs. High) between-subjects ANOV  
was conducted.  This analysis revealed a main effect for arousal condition, F(1, 55) = 
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9.81, p < .01.  As was expected, participants reported higher levels of arousal in the 
high arousal condition (M = 3.09, SE = .13) than in the low arousal condition (M = 
2.50, SE = .14). All other effects were nonsignificant (All Fs < 1). 
Breadth of Attention 
 To test the hypotheses regarding breadth of attention, a 2 (Regulatory Mode: 
Locomotion versus Assessment) x 2 (Arousal: Low versus High) between-subject 
ANOVA was conducted.  As shown in Table 8, this analysis revealed an interaction 
between regulatory mode and arousal, F(1, 55) = 9.47, p < .01.  Figure 7 displays the 
means for each of the four cells.  Individuals operating in a locomotion mode 
exhibited lesser breadth of attention in the high arousal condition (M = 6.19, SE = 
16.55) than the low arousal condition (M = 58.71, SE = 17.09), F(1, 55) =  4.87, p < 
.05.  Individuals operating in an assessment mode exhibited greater breadth of 
attention in the high arousal condition (M = 63.63, SE = 17.09) than the low arousal 
condition (M = 9.78, SE = 18.36), F(1, 55) =  4.61, p < .05. 
 
Table 8. Summary of Analysis of Variance (Study 6) 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Source       SS          DF    MS            F 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Regulatory Mode   265.74         1             265.74          .06 
 
Arousal    6.46           1  6.46           .001 
 
Mode x Arousal  41477.77      1  41477.77      9.47** 
 
Error   240999.11     55  4381.80  
_____________________________________________________ 
 
** p < .01 
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The data from Study 6 build on the results from Study 5 by experimentally 
manipulating the regulatory mode and arousal variables.  Specifically, it was 
predicted and found that individuals high on locomotion tend to exhibit greater 
focusing of attention under high (vs. low) states of arousal, whereas individuals high 
on assessment exhibit greater broadening of attention under high (vs. low) states of 
arousal.   These first two studies have found the same pattern of findings as was 
found in the four studies investigating the need for closure as a moderator of the 
arousal-attention link. 
Although the research so far has clearly been consistent with the predictions, 
it is important to be just as vigilant in testing the influence of regulatory mde as a 
moderator as it was in testing the need for closure as a moderator.  Both studies 5 and 
6 on regulatory mode have used the Navon (1977) measure of focus/breadth of 
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attention.  Therefore, a seventh study was designed to test an extension of these 
findings to the Kimchi and Palmer (1982) measure of focus/breadth of attention. 
Study 7 
The aim of Study 7 was to conceptually replicate the findings from Study 6 
using a different measure of focus/breadth of attention.  Specifically, locomotion 
versus assessment was manipulated using the Avnet and Higgins (2003) 
manipulation.  Arousal was manipulated by presenting participants with positively-
valenced arousing pictures or neutral pictures.  Focus of attention was measured u ing 
Kimchi and Palmer’s (1982) local-global measure.   
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four University of Maryland undergraduates enrolled in psychology 
courses participated.  They received compensation in the form of credit in a 
psychology course.   
Procedure 
Regulatory Mode.  Locomotion versus assessment was manipulated using the 
same procedure as in Study 6. 
Arousal.  Arousal was manipulated in same manner as in Study 6. That is, 
participants were presented with positively-valenced arousing pictures from the IAPS 
in the high arousal condition, and neutral pictures in the low arousal condition. 
Breadth of Attention.  Participants completed the same local-global processing 
task as in Studies 1, 2, and 3 (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982).   
44 
Manipulation Check.  To check the efficacy of the arousal manipulation, 
participants completed the 24-item perceived arousal scale used in Studies 1, 5, and 6
(Anderson et al., 1996; Anderson, et al., 1995).   
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 A 2 (Regulatory Mode: Locomotion vs. Assessment) x 2(Arousal: Low vs. 
High) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted in order to test the influence of th
arousal manipulation on self-reported arousal.  This analysis revealed a main effect 
for arousal condition, F(1, 60) = 4.59, p < .05.  As was expected, participants reported 
higher levels of arousal in the high arousal condition (M = 2.94, SE = .13) than in the 
low arousal condition (M = 2.53, SE = .13). All other effects were nonsignificant (All 
Fs < 1). 
Breadth of Attention 
 The hypotheses regarding breadth of attention were tested by conducting a 2 
(Regulatory Mode: Locomotion versus Assessment) x 2 (Arousal: Low versus High) 
between-subjects ANOVA.  As shown in Table 9, this analysis revealed an 
interaction between regulatory mode and arousal, F(1, 60) = 9.67, p < .01.  In the 
locomotion condition, participants in the high arousal condition exhibited lesser 
breadth of attention (M = 12.31, SE = .69) than participants in the low arousal 
condition (M = 14.69, SE = .69), F(1, 60) = 5.87, p < .05.  In the assessment 
condition, participants in the high arousal condition exhibit greater breadth of 
attention (M = 14.88, SE = .69) than participants in the low arousal condition (M = 




Table 9. Summary of Analysis of Variance (Study 7) 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Source       SS          DF    MS            F 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Regulatory Mode   2.67             1              2.67            .34 
 
Arousal    .77           1    .77          .10 
 
Mode x Arousal  74.39            1  74.39          9.67** 
 
Error   461.56          60   7.69  
_____________________________________________________ 
 
** p < .01 
 



























The results from this study again supported the predictions regarding 
regulatory mode and arousal, as they jointly determine focus/breadth of attention, 
while importantly extending the empirical evidence to an additional measure of 
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focus/breadth of attention.  However, both experimental studies on regulatory mode 
have used positively-valenced stimuli to induce arousal.  Therefore, it remains 
possible that the effect of arousal in the regulatory mode studies is limited to 
conditions in which arousal is paired with positive stimuli, or that the positivity of the 
stimuli is driving the effect rather than the arousal.  Thus, an eighth study was 
designed in which negatively-valenced stimuli were presented.  Another limitation 
with the regulatory mode studies is that both experimental manipulations relied on 
pictures to induce arousal.  Therefore, the eighth study utilized passages to induce 
arousal, as in the need for closure Studies 2 and 3.  
Study 8 
In order to build on Studies 6 and 7, two changes were made to the arousal 
manipulation in Study 8.  First, arousal was manipulated using negatively-valanced 
stimuli rather than positively-valenced stimuli.  Second, this arousal manipulation 
was conducted by having participants read passages rather than view images.  
Regulatory mode was manipulated by having participants recall times in which they 
successfully used locomotion strategies or assessment strategies.  Focu /breadth of 
attention was assessed using the Kimchi and Palmer (1982) measure.  
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-four undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses participated 
in exchange for course credit.  Forty-five participants were women, and 19 
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participants were men.  The age of participants ranged from 18 to 15, with a mean age 
of 20.1.  
Procedure 
Regulatory Mode.  Locomotion versus assessment was manipulated using the 
same procedure as in Studies 6 and 7. 
Arousal.  Arousal was manipulated using the same general procedure as Study 
2.  That is, participants were presented with passages from the ANET (Bradley & 
Lang, 2007) pre-tested with respect to level of arousal.  In contrast to Study 2, the 
arousing pictures were negatively valenced. Pictures in the low arousal condition 
were neutral in valence.   
Breadth of Attention.  Participants complete the same local-global processing 
task as in Studies 1, 2, 3, and 8 (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982).   
Results 
A 2 (Regulatory Mode: Locomotion versus Assessment) x 2 (Arousal: Low 
versus High) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted in order to test the 
predictions regarding focus/breadth of attention.  As shown in Table 10, this analysis 
revealed an interaction between regulatory mode and arousal, F(1, 60) = 8.35, p < 
.01.  In the locomotion condition, participants in the high arousal condition exhibited 
lesser breadth of attention (M = 10.27, SE = .98) than participants in the low arousal 
condition (M = 13.25, SE = .84), F(1, 60) = 5.35, p < .05.  In the assessment 
condition, participants in the high arousal condition exhibited greater breadth of 
attention (M = 14.67, SE = .98) than participants in the low arousal condition (M = 
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12.14, SE = 1.00), although this difference was marginally significant, F(1 60) = 
3.23, p = .077.  The results from this study are depicted in Figure 9.  
 
 
Table 10. Summary of Analysis of Variance (Study 8) 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Source       SS          DF    MS            F 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Regulatory Mode   42.56             1             42.56          2.98 
 
Arousal    .83             1    .83            .06 
 
Mode x Arousal  119.05            1  119.05          8.35** 
 
Error    855.73          60  14.262  
_____________________________________________________ 
 
** p < .01 
 




























The results from Study 8 show once again the interaction between regulatory 
mode and arousal in causing focus/breadth of attention.  Building on the first three 
regulatory mode studies, this study used negatively-valenced passages to induce 
arousal.  The pattern of results conceptually replicates the results of studies using 
positively-valenced pictures to induce arousal.  Therefore, it seems that arousal is 
driving the effect, rather than something to do with the valence or specific 
presentation format of the stimuli.  
 The aim of the studies on regulatory mode was to extend the findings on need 
for closure to additional processing strategies, allowing for a more general claim to be 
made about the interaction between arousal and processing strategy in determining 
focus/breadth of attention.  Specifically, it was predicted and found that individuals 
high on locomotion would exhibit greater focusing of attention as their level of 
arousal increases, whereas individuals high on assessment would exhibit greater 
broadening of attention as their level of arousal increases.  The methods employed in 
these four studies used two operations of the regulatory mode variable, three 
operations of the arousal variable, and two operations of the focus of attention 
variable, while utilizing both correlational and experimental research designs.  A 
convergence of results across these operations provides compelling evidence for the 
hypotheses regarding the interaction between regulatory mode and arousal in causing 
focus/breadth of attention.     
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Chapter 3: General Discussion 
 
After six decades of research on the arousal-attention link, psychologists have 
settled on a law-like principle in which increasing levels of arousal were presumed to 
lead to greater focusing of attention (originally proposed by Easterbrook, 1959).  This 
principle was important in explaining the Yerkes-Dodson law and many social 
phenomena.  Yet, recent developments in the understanding of the role of arousal in 
goal pursuit and knowledge formation suggest that arousal may serve as information 
regarding urgency and importance, ultimately augmenting whatever processing 
strategy is active (Storbeck & Clore, 2008).  Specifically, it was proposed that arousal 
may not necessarily lead to a focusing of attention, but may instead augment active 
processing strategies.  Because some processing strategies lead to a broadening of 
attention (while others lead to a focusing of attention), it is possible that increasing 
arousal may lead to a broadening of attention (while at other times leading to a 
focusing of attention).   
Based on lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski , 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996) and regulatory mode theory (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000), the 
present research investigated the possibility that the epistemic need for closure and 
the regulatory modes of locomotion and assessment would moderate the arousal-
attention link.  The data from eight studies is consistent with this prediction.  Arousal 
has been shown to lead to a focusing of attention when need for closure or 
locomotion is high, and to a broadening of attention when need for closure is low or 
when assessment is high.  
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The central aim of this research was to investigate the possibility that the 
Easterbrook hypothesis needs to be seriously qualified.  The eight studies reported 
here conclusively show that under some conditions, arousal leads to a broadening of 
attention (while at other times leads to a focusing of attention).  Specifically, arousal 
seems to augment whatever processing strategy is active.  As such, when a processing 
strategy aimed at broadening is active (need to avoid closure, assessment), then 
arousal leads to a broadening of attention. This framework is capable of explaining 
the previous research in support of the Easterbrook hypothesis.  The typical study 
asked participants to engage in one central task, in which they were instructed was the
most important demand (e.g. a pursuit meter task).  They were then told that they 
should detect changes to some peripheral stimuli (e.g. a light turns on in their 
peripheral vision).  This type of task induces a processing strategy aimed at focusing 
of attention due to the instructions in which participants are told that one task is more 
important than another.  This general tendency to focus attention is then augmented 
under high arousal conditions.   
Beyond merely arguing for a revision of the Easterbrook hypothesis, the 
present results provide evidence in support of arousal-as-information theory 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2008) that goes beyond the previous tests of the theory.  The 
theory suggests that arousal will serve as information regarding the urgency or 
importance of active processing strategies.  Previous research has shown that arous l 
increases the influence of positive or negative emotions on information processing 
tasks (e.g., Bless, Clore, Golisano, Rabel, & Schwarz, 1996; Corson & Verrier, 2007; 
Hamm, Schupp, & Weike, 2003; Gomez, Stahel, & Danuser, 2004; Storneck & Clore, 
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2005).  Yet this research stopped short of manipulating processing strategies directly.  
The present research directly manipulated the processing strategies of ned for 
closure, locomotion, and assessment.  Consistent with arousal-as-information theory, 
the effects of each of these processing strategies on focus of attention was incre sed 
under conditions of high (vs. low) arousal.   
These results of these studies have implications for the understanding of need 
for closure and the regulatory modes of locomotion and assessment.  Based on these 
results, we can conclude that the impact of a need for closure or a need to avoid 
closure on information processing is augmented by concurrent arousal.  Individuals 
who are high on the need for closure focus their attention, leading to a processing of 
fewer available pieces of information, especially when the individual is also aroused. 
Similarly, individuals high on the need for closure under high (vs. low) 
arousal should terminate information search more quickly (Dougherty & Harbison, 
2007; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), generate fewer hypothesis (Mayesless & 
Kruglanski, 1987), base judgments on the most accessible information (Ford & 
Kruglanski, 1995), be more confident in their judgments (Mayesless & Kruglanski, 
1987), and experience less regret after making poor decisions (Mannetti, et al., 2007).  
In addition, classic need for closure effects such as an increased reliance on 
stereotypes (Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996; 
Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), and increased group centrism (DeGrada, Kruglanski, 
Mannetti & Pierro, 1999; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & DeGrada, 2006; Pierro, 
Mannetti, DeGrada, Livi & Kruglanski, 2003) should be even stronger when those 
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individuals are in a high (vs. low) arousal state. Future research could profitably 
explore these possibilities. 
The implications of these results for regulatory mode theory are also 
important.  Based on these results, we can conclude that the impact of locomotion and 
assessment on information processing is magnified by concurrent arousal.  
Individuals who are high on locomotion are oriented towards movement, leading to a 
focusing of attention, especially under high (vs. low) arousal conditions.  Individuals 
high on assessment are oriented towards the evaluation of alternatives, leading to a 
broadening of attention, especially when aroused.  The usual outcomes of locomotion, 
such as decreased counterfactual thinking and regret (Pierro et al., 2008) and 
increased optimism (Kruglanski et al., 2000) should be increased by high (vs. low) 
arousal levels.  Well known outcomes of an assessment orientation, such as 
sensitivity to criticism from others, which results in anxiety in social interactions 
(Higgins, et al., 2003) and conformity to social norms (Pierro, Mannetti, Higgins, & 
Kruglanski, 2002) should be even greater during times of high (vs. low) arousal.  
Future research could profitably explore these possibilities. 
The discovery of multiples moderators of the arousal-attention link (need for 
closure, locomotion, assessment) increases the confidence with which we can state 
that the Easterbrook hypothesis should be qualified.  It also suggests a more general 
point that any processing strategy aimed at focusing or broadening should be 
augmented by arousal, and should show the same pattern of results.  For example, the 
regulatory focus orientations of promotion and prevention (Higgins, 1998) may show 
a similar pattern.  Because individuals high on promotion eagerly approach positive 
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outcomes, they may focus their attention in order to pursue a desirable end, and this 
tendency may be increased in high (vs. low) arousal conditions.  Because individuals 
high on prevention attempt to vigilantly prevent bad outcomes from occurring, they 
may broaden their attention in order to detect any possible threat, and this tendency 
may be increased when arousal is high (vs. low).  
Because the arousal-attention link has been used to explain many social and 
cognitive phenomena, the work reported here should have far-reaching implications 
as well.  While arousal has been shown to lead to ‘weapon focus,’ it seems that based 
on the current analysis that arousal may sometimes have the reverse effect.  That is, 
arousal may sometimes lead the perceiver to broadening their attention and to view 
more information in the context.  It is likely the case that individuals in these 
situations are often high on the need for closure and high on the locomotion 
orientation, focused on determining what is going on and what to do.  Because of this, 
the arousing aspects of the situation lead to a focusing of attention.  The advantage is 
that they are aware of what the gun is doing.  However, the disadvantage is that they 
are unable to react to other events in the environment and to process information 
about the person holding the gun.  These could be critical pieces of information for 
the person who wishes to remain safe, determine the best course of action, and/or to 
intervene in some manner.   
However, individuals who are low on the need for closure or high on the 
assessment orientation should experience a broadening of attention due to the 
arousing nature of the situation, leading them to take in more information.   This 
could lead them to see the movement of more people, more clues about the nature of 
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the situation as a whole, and to glean relevant information about the person with the 
gun.  Such a processing strategy could be particularly important to police officers and 
witnesses who need to take this information into account when re-telling the events 
and/or deciding whether or how to intervene.  For example, a police officer could 
better be able to determine whether innocent bystanders are going to be in the way
should s/he decide to shoot at the person with the gun.  Police training could 
potentially lead to improved thinking strategies in such situations.   
In short, the present studies provide compelling evidence that arousal 
augments currently active processing strategies.  Because of this, arou al sometimes 
leads to a focusing of attention in some cases, but leads to a broadening of attentin in 
other cases.  This framework should replace the Easterbrook hypothesis as the best 
explanation of the attention-arousal link.  Because the arousal-attention link has been 
used to explain phenomena in many domains, much future research could profitably 
explore whether the present results have implications in such situations.  Moreover, 
such research could suggest possible interventions that would circumvent the negative 
consequences of focusing attention when broader attention would be helpful.  Future 
research is needed to test the application of this conceptualization to other processing 
strategies and other measures of attention.  One limitation of the current research i  
that arousal levels did not reach the extreme levels that are sometimes found in the 
situations of interest.   More research is needed to test whether the effects of 
extremely high levels of arousal would lead to even greater effects in a linear fashion, 
or whether the pattern of relations differs at such high levels.  Finally, future research 
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could explore whether the findings reported here apply to other aspects of visual 
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